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Constitutional Law
Article III and the Political-Question Doctrine
Scott Dodson1
Federal courts may not adjudicate a “nonjusticiable political
question.”2 Though this doctrine has ancient roots, the modern
incarnation of the political-question doctrine was cast by Baker v.
Carr, which famously articulated a six-factor test for identifying
a political question.3 The first two factors remain prominent:
(1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department” and (2) “a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”4
Baker called the political-question doctrine “primarily a
function of the separation of powers”5 but did not purport to
source the doctrine in any particular provision of the Constitution.
What is the constitutional source of the political-question
doctrine? And does that source tell us anything about its nature?
This chapter answers those questions.
The Source Isn’t Article III
Article III, a repository of other separation-of-powers
applicable to the federal judiciary, makes intuitive sense as the
political-question doctrine’s source, and, in a few cases, the Court
has connected the political-question doctrine to Article III and its
principles. In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon,6 Oregon sued a business in state court after the business
refused to pay a tax levied under authority of a state constitutional
amendment adopted by ballot initiative; the business defended on
the ground that the initiative process violated the Guarantee
Clause.7 The state courts held that the defense was justiciable but
1

Excerpted and adapted from Scott Dodson, Article III and the Political
Question Doctrine, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 681 (2021).
2
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
3
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 210.
6
223 US 118 (1912).
7
Id. at 136.
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meritless. On writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
held the question “within the scope of the powers conferred upon
Congress, and not, therefore, within the reach of judicial power.”8
Pacific States dismissed the writ for lack of jurisdiction,
presumably under Article III, a result that, paradoxically, allowed
the state-court decision on the merits to stand.
In Rucho v. Common Cause,9 the Court held partisangerrymandering claims to be nonjusticiable directly under Article
III.10 Because testing the constitutionality of those claims would
lack judicially discoverable and manageable standards under
Baker Factor 2, those claims are “outside the Court’s competence
and therefore beyond the courts’ jurisdiction” under Article III.11
The Court therefore vacated the lower-court decisions and ordered
the cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.12
But Pacific States and Rucho represent a minority view about
the political-question doctrine’s connection to Article III. Far
more cases disavow or distance Article III from the politicalquestion doctrine.
In Luther v. Borden,13 for example, a case presenting the
question of which government of Rhode Island was lawful, the
Court held the Guarantee Clause to give Congress the power to
decide that question (and to delegate that power to the
President).14 But the presence of a political question did not
deprive the Court of power to decide the case, and the Court never
mentioned Article III. To the contrary, when the President
answered the question by authorizing the National Guard to put
down the insurrectionist government, the Court considered the
question authoritatively answered, applied that answer to the case
at hand, and affirmed the lower court’s holding on the merits.15
In Baker v. Carr,16 the Court held justiciable the question of
whether a state’s districting plan that gave some voters more vote
8

Id. at 150–51.
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
10
Id. at 2493–96.
11
Id. at 2494.
12
Id. at 2508.
13
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
14
Id. at 42.
15
Id. at 46–47.
16
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9
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power than others was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause
(and the Court held, on the merits, that the plan was not consistent
with the Clause).17 In discussing the political-question doctrine,
the Court did not cite to Article III or reference its language;
instead, the Court expressly contrasted justiciability with Article
III jurisdiction.18 Later, the Court again treated the politicalquestion doctrine as distinct from Article III jurisdiction in Powell
v. McCormack.19
In Nixon v. United States,20 the Court considered
nonjusticiable the question of whether the Senate court, consistent
with the Impeachments Clause, take impeachment evidence by
Senate committee rather than the full Senate.21 No opinion cited
to Article III as a basis for determining the existence of a political
question, and the Court appears to have resolved the case on
nonjurisdictional grounds.22 Precedent, then, offers no clear
answer about the political-question doctrine’s source.
Further, an Article III source would create some odd results.
For one, an Article III source cannot explain why the Court in
Luther and Nixon claimed to retain some authority to decide
political questions in extreme cases, such as in obvious Guarantee
Clause violations and in hypothetical impeachments based on a
coin flip. Article III limits on judicial power admit of no such
exceptions for extreme cases.
Additionally, an Article III source would leave an unsettling
role for state courts. Because Article III’s limitations do not apply
to state courts,23 a political-question doctrine derived from Article
III would allow state courts to adjudicate important constitutional
issues that federal courts could not. Indeed, Pacific States’s
17

Id. at 237.
Id. at 198.
19
395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969).
20
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
21
Id. at 227.
22
The district court held that it did have subject matter jurisdiction but
nonetheless dismissed for lack of justiciability. Nixon v. United States,
744 F. Supp. 9, 11–12, 14 (D.D.C. 1990). The Supreme Court affirmed
that result, and two justices who would have held the claim justiciable
but meritless concurred in the judgment. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239 (White,
J., concurring). Those circumstances indicate that the Supreme Court
agreed that political questions warrant nonjurisdictional dismissals.
23
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
18
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dismissal of the writ of error allowed the state-court judgment on
the merits of the Guarantee Clause question to stand. And because
states are entitled to give their state courts judicial power beyond
the strictures of Article III, state courts might be able to decide
partisan-gerrymandering claims under the federal Constitution
even though the federal courts could not. More extreme
possibilities exist. How odd would it be to learn that while the
doctrine prevents the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing the
propriety of an impeachment trial of the President of the United
States, the doctrine does not bar a state judge—perhaps from a
state whose population and government officials strongly support
the President—from doing so?24
The Source is the Substantive Law
Underlying Each Political Question
If Article III isn’t the source of the political-question doctrine,
what is? The answer is that the political question doctrine is
sourced in the substantive law at issue. It is the Guarantee Clause
itself (or the Impeachments Clause itself, or even the Equal
Protection Clause itself) that makes something nonjusticiable.
Application of the doctrine can have (but need not always have)
Article III effects by, say, calling for nonjudicial standards that a
federal court couldn’t apply without violating Article III. But the
doctrine begins with the substantive law.
In Factor 1 cases, a “textual commitment” refers to whether
the underlying substantive law—the Impeachments Clause, the
Militia Clause, the Qualifications Clause, or the like—allocates
interpretative or decisionmaking authority over the question to an
entity other than the federal courts. If so, then Article III has
nothing more to add. Nonjusticiability under Factor 1 thus arises
solely from the substantive law, not from Article III.
Article III is itself allocative by committing judicial powers to
the courts and, by implication, excluding the courts from
legislative and executive powers. But the Article III allocative
standards do not drive the Factor 1 determination and, indeed, are
irrelevant to it. A question could meet all the requirements of
24

But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005 n.2 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“This Court, of course, may not prohibit
state courts from deciding political questions . . . .”).
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Article III, in that it is brought in the form of a constitutional
“case” and with “judicial” standards available for adjudication,
but if the substantive law commits the question instead to a
coordinate branch, then the question is nonjusticiable in the
federal courts despite Article III.
Pure Factor 2 cases are somewhat different. To date, partisangerrymandering claims represent the only pure Factor 2 political
questions. These claims are political questions because the
substantive-rights provisions of the Constitution provide
standards for distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering that aren’t judicially manageable or
discoverable. Thus, Factor 2 cases are based on the standards
supplied by the substantive law. If the standards supplied by the
substantive law aren’t judicially discoverable or manageable, then
that determination will have an Article III effect of rendering an
adjudicative decision based on those standards outside the federal
judicial power. So Factor 2 does implicate Article III. But the
determination that the law supplies only nonjudicial standards is
sourced, just like in Factor 1 cases, in the substantive law.
What a Substantive-Law Source Says About the Doctrine
Reorientating the political-question doctrine around the
substantive law has several important ramifications.
First, because Article III is not the source, federal courts retain
Article III jurisdiction over cases presenting political questions.
Indeed, if the political question can be avoided or has already been
answered by the appropriate decisionmaker, then a federal court
can decide a case presenting a political question on the merits, just
as in Luther. If the answer to an unanswered political question is
a necessary condition to maintaining a claim or defense, then the
federal court should stay the case until receiving an answer,
dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or strike the defense.
Second, because substantive federal law binds state courts
under the Supremacy Clause, a substantive-law delegation of
adjudicatory authority under Baker Factor 1 must be binding on
state courts as well. For example, because the Impeachments
Clause grants the Senate “sole” power to “try” federal
impeachments, state courts have no more authority to “try” a
federal impeachment than federal courts.
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However, if the political question arises only because of
Factor 2—because the substantive law requires application of
standards inappropriate for a federal court—a state court
potentially could decide a political question even though a federal
court could not. Although such asymmetry between state and
federal courts poses problems generally, those problems are
decidedly less forceful in the context of partisan gerrymandering,
the only pure Factor 2 political question presently recognized,
because partisan-gerrymandering claims involve questions of
state politics, an area of familiarity to some state courts. True,
state courts might generate a patchwork of different
interpretations of how the Constitution applies to various
districting plans, but the Constitution contemplates redistricting
nonuniformity by granting the states significant control over
districting standards—control that already creates a patchwork of
redistricting standards across the country.
Third, because political questions do not deprive courts of
jurisdiction, courts retain authority to decide matters peripheral to
the political question even if they cannot answer the political
question. Peripheral matters include determining which
decisionmaker has constitutional authority under the substantive
law to answer a political question and issuing orders protecting
that decisionmaker’s authority when a different putative
decisionmaker attempts to usurp that authority. If, for example,
the President attempted unilaterally to declare war, the politicalquestion doctrine would not stop the judiciary from holding that
presidential declaration unlawful—not because the declaration of
war was incorrect but because the Declare War Clause gives that
power to Congress, not to the President. Federal courts thus can
enforce the delegation of a political question, even if they cannot
answer the political question itself.
Fourth, even if a substantive law makes an issue a political
question, other substantive laws could grant judicial authority
over the same subject. For example, although the Impeachments
Clause prevents a federal court from trying an impeachment, the
Fifth Amendment might permit a federal court (or a state court) to
exercise interpretive and adjudicatory authority over whether the
Senate’s trial comported with due process. A substantive-law
focus on political questions, rather than an Article III focus, thus
gives federal courts a limited role in some political question cases
and helps explain why racial-gerrymandering claims can be
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nonjusticiable under the Guarantee Clause but justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause.
Fifth, if the substantive law allocates adjudicatory authority
under Baker Factor 1, the allocated decisionmaker could, if
consistent with the nondelegation doctrine, delegate that
adjudicatory authority to a different decisionmaker, including,
potentially, to a federal court. Thus, the federal courts—and state
courts—could exercise adjudicatory authority over a Factor 1
political question under a lawful delegation from the original
decisionmaker. Orienting the doctrine around the substantive law
helps explain why the Court has suggested that federal courts can
hear cases under legislation to enforce the Guarantee Clause.25
Even Factor 2 cases could be delegated to the federal courts if
Congress supplied judicially manageable standards, such as under
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which allows Congress to supply statutory standards that are more
protective of the constitutional right.26
Sixth, a substantive-law focus harmonizes the federal
political-question doctrine with state political-question doctrines.
A state constitution that commits interpretative or adjudicatory
authority of a provision to, say, the state governor might give rise
to a political question in state court under state law. But if the
federal political-question doctrine is based on Article III, then a
federal court hearing such a state-law claim would be bound by
the federal version—but not the state version—which could lead
to vertical differences in justiciability. A state constitutional
question committed by the state constitution to the governor, for
example, would be justiciable in federal court if posed within a
case otherwise meeting the requirements of Article III, even if the
state constitution would make the question nonjusticiable in state
court. But reliance on the substantive law for sourcing the
political-question doctrine—including state substantive law—
would instead require the federal court to defer to the state

25

Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43 (“It rested with Congress, too, to
determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfil this guarantee.
They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed
it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened
which required the federal government to interfere.”).
26
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 532 (1997).
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political-question doctrine under Erie and vertical choice-of-law
principles, thus producing the same result in federal or state court.
Conclusion
In the end, reorienting the political question doctrine away
from Article III and toward the substantive law creates a more
sensible and workable doctrine.
*
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